Abstract. This study investigates institutional and economic reasons for downward wage rigidity regarding three occupational skill groups. Based on a survey of 801 firms in Germany and an econometric analysis, we find strong support for explanations based on the effects of labour union contracts and efficiency wages that differ between skill groups. Survey respondents indicate that labour union contracts and implicit contracts are important reasons for wage rigidity for the (less) skilled. Specific human capital and negative signals for new hires are causes of the stickiness of wages for the highly skilled. Compared with US evidence, German firms seem to attach more importance to labour union contracts and specific human capital.
Introduction
Despite high unemployment rates and strong competition for jobs among the unemployed, firms in Germany as well as in other industrialized countries rarely tend to cut wages. In recessions, hour's reductions and workers' displacements seem to be more common than wage reductions. As a result, labour markets appear to be rather imperfect. Given the costs of the resulting unemployment, the question arises why societies treat themselves to the luxury of wage rigidity.great macroeconomic debates. As a prerequisite for constructing macroeconomic models, an understanding of the forces that prevent labour markets from clearing is essential.
Several studies aim to shed light on the relevance of institutional and theoretical explanations for wage rigidity in firms. For recent comprehensive discussions, see Bewley (1999) , Howitt (2002) , and Malcomson (1999) . A special branch of these studies contributes to the literature by asking firms why they behave the way they do (see Table 1 ).
2 They indicate that economic theory provides wellfounded explanations for wage rigidity, among them are efficiency wage theories, contract theory, implicit contract theory, and fairness theory. Note, however, that sample sizes in most of these surveys are small and firms are not always selected randomly. Furthermore, information concerning the type of labour contracts is rare and the methodology used differs between the studies that makes comparisons of the results difficult if not impossible. Kaufman (1984) interviewed 26 small firms in Britain, Blinder and Choi (1990) 19 large firms in New Jersey and Eastern Pennsylvania. Campbell and Kamlani (1997) focus on five prominent explanations of wage rigidity (contract theory, implicit contract theory, efficiency wage theories, fair wage theory, and insideroutsider theory) and introduced three skill categories of labour. Their study is based on a survey of 184 mainly large US firms. Lundborg (1995, 2003) surveyed 159 relatively large unionized firms from the Swedish manufacturing sector in 1991 and again in 1998. In a further study, Agell and Bennmarker (2002) interviewed 885 representatively selected Swedish firms in 1999. Bewley (1995 Bewley ( , 1998 Bewley ( , 1999 interviewed 335 business and union leaders, counsellors of unemployed persons, and business consultants in the northeast of the USA.
Our study, which is the first survey of firms on wage rigidity for Germany, comes closest to the methodology used by Campbell and Kamlani (1997) . We extend their work in different directions. Although the design of our questionnaire deliberately contains the questions, among others, raised by these authors in order to allow a direct comparison, we additionally collect detailed information on the legal type of collective wage agreements and labour contracts of the firms as control variables. Moreover, our findings are based on econometric methods and a larger and randomly selected sample of firms. In our study, the influence of firm-specific factors and labour contracts on the assessment of different explanations of wage rigidity is tested by using ordered probit models (rather than Kaufman (1984) The sample consists of 26 British firms in Wales, the West Midlands, and the Greater London area, concentrating on small non-unionized firms. The median firm size is seven employees, and only six firms have more than 50 employees
Firms are asked whether they can find qualified personnel at less than current wages, and if so, what prevents the firm from cutting wages. The most common response to the latter question is that wage reductions would upset workers and that their response would be a reduction in work effort Blinder and Choi (1990) 19 large firms in New Jersey and Eastern Pennsylvania are interviewed. These firms are selected from Ward's Business Directory of US Firms, which lists companies with annual sales of more than $11 million Strong support is found for theories of wage rigidity, including fairness and labour turnover Bewley (1995 Bewley ( , 1998 Bewley ( , 1999 ) 336 interviews with firms (246), temporary labour services (13), headhunters (15), advisors of the unemployed (26), labour leaders (19), labour lawyers (4) and management consultants (13) in the northwest of the USA. There is much variation between interviews in the topics discussed and in the questions asked of respondents, so most of the study involves anecdotal evidence. The sample is obtained by net working, starting with friends, relatives, and calls to local firms
The most important reason why firms generally do not cut pay during a recession is that they fear a pay cut would adversely affect workers' morale and motivation. Respondents indicate that morale is related more to wage changes and particularly wage decreases than to wage levels The most important reason for wage rigidity is found for explanations based on adverse selection in quits and on the effect of wages on effort. The latter effect is found to be stronger for low-skilled than for high-skilled workers. Implicit contracts are an important explanation for wage rigidity for less skilled and blue-collar workers, whereas reducing turnover is an important one for white-collar workers Firms in Germany and other countries under consideration operate in roughly comparable economic environments. Although the economic rationale for wage rigidity may be independent of national legislation, the relevance of each of these explanations may differ. Because German workers enjoy a higher degree of employment protection than, for example, workers in the USA do, and codetermination and collective bargaining are more common in Germany, their bargaining power is supposed to be higher, especially in collective wage bargaining rounds. Differences in legislation may also indirectly influence the relevance of efficiency wage explanations for wage rigidity, because more strict employment protection legislation or a wider application of collective wage agreements might impose more restrictions on firms' wage policies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our and some peculiarities of the structure of wage contracts in the responding firms. Section 3 discusses firm responses with respect to distinct explanations of wage rigidity and compares the results with those found for the USA, among others. Section 4 highlights the firms' support for each of the statements on wage rigidity. Section 5 investigates the issue of pay differentiation in labour union contracts. Section 6 concludes.
Overview of the survey and the structure of wage contracts in Germany
Between February and April 2000, 801 firms responded to a standardized written questionnaire that was sent to the head of the human resources department of 5,158 firms. These firms were selected randomly (after stratification) from about 160,000 firms (each with more than nine employees) operating in the following industries: chemical industry; metal industry, electrical goods industry, and machinery; wholesale and retail trade; finance and insurance; firm-related services; and other sectors. Details of the sample design are relegated to the Appendix. Table 2 contains descriptive statistics about the sample population and the respective population of all firms. The survey had a response rate of roughly 16 per cent, as well as a high item response rate. Descriptive statistics about the characteristics of all firms have been calculated under the assumption of a random response. It turns out that respondents' support for the reasons for wage rigidity does not differ substantially between the sample population and the respective population of all firms.
To begin with, 38 per cent of the firms apply labour union contracts. These firms employ 70 per cent of sample employees indicating that collective wage agreements rise with firm size, which confirms the findings of Kohaut and Schnabel (2003) based on the 'IAB-Betriebspanel' survey. Each of these firms has either industryor firm-level bargaining, i.e. they are members of the bargaining employers' association or bargain individually with a union, or, to a lesser extent, they apply labour union contracts on a voluntary basis, in order to avoid costs associated with wage bargaining, for example. Although these numbers document the role of collective wage bargaining in Germany, readers should keep in mind that 62 per cent of the firms, employing 30 per cent of the workers, do not participate in this system. Furthermore, in roughly 50 per cent of the firms with collective wage agreements effective wages are significantly higher than wages collectively bargained (see, for example, Franz, 2003) . The presence of collective wage agreements therefore does not necessarily indicate that wage determination at the firm level is absent. In 83 per cent of the responding firms, wages are bargained individually between employers and workers, either as an alternative or in addition to labour union contracts. Both industry-level and individual wage bargaining can be frequently observed in the same firm.
Taken together, there is a stronger emphasis on industry-level wage bargaining in Germany than, for example, in the USA. Although firms with industry-level bargaining are not forced legally to pay their non-union workforce wages as high as negotiated, as a rule, firms do so for obvious reasons (e.g. otherwise the employees would join the union). Around 80 per cent of the firms with labour union contracts responded that their pay schemes do not differ between union and non-union workers (see Table 2 ).
3 These figures differ remarkably from those in other countries. The causes of wage rigidity may be subject to firm heterogeneity, as has been emphasized by Bewley (1999) . Hence, the survey tries to capture essential parts of this heterogeneity. The reasons for wage rigidity might differ between firms with and without labour union contracts, as well as with respect to industry affiliation, firm size, skill level of the workforce, regional location of the (headquarter of the) firm, and whether firms have difficulties recruiting new staff, pointing to the labour market situation as an influence on firms' responses.
Three broad skill categories are distinguished -highly skilled, skilled, and less skilled. Less skilled are defined as workers without a formal occupational degree, skilled are workers who have been certified by the German Dual Vocational Training System, and highly skilled are workers who have received a degree from a (technical) university. Our definitions of skill groups differ from the ones used by Campbell and Kamlani (1997) in order to account for the German educational and vocational system. In contrast to the USA, the majority of blue-collar workers in Germany have been educated in the German Dual Vocational Training System, and should be categorized as being skilled. Hence, in the German survey the share of skilled workers with a more specific vocational training is higher than in the USA. The industrial composition between both countries is similar with respect to manufacturing and trade. In the German survey, however, there are more firms belonging to the firm-related service sector and fewer firms belonging to finance, insurance, and construction.
Explanations for wage rigidity

Introduction
Firms were given nine statements based on various theories of wage rigidity. 5 The introductory statement was: 'Even in economically bad times or in times of high unemployment, firms seldom reduce workers' pay, although that may help them survive and save working places. Please assess the following explanations as "not important", "of minor importance", "moderately important", or "very important" '. Respondents were asked to assess the statements for each of the three worker categories separately. Table 3 reports the frequency distribution of the responses for the nine statements, two values for the average scores -one for the In Campbell and Kamlani (1997) , this category contains workers performing jobs requiring less than 2 years of college.
sake of comparison the sample and one for the population of firms -and the average scores from Campbell and Kamlani (1997; see Table 4 ). The number of observations with valid information per skill group and explanation varies between 744 and 792. The responses to statement a (labour union contracts) are reported separately for the groups of firms with labour union contracts. In order to allow for comparison, the four responses were converted into numerical scores: 1 (not important), 2 (of minor importance), 3 (moderately important), and 4 (very important). An average score over 2.5 is seen as strong support and an average over 3.0 as very strong support (see Blinder and Choi, 1990 ). In addition, Table 3 reports the whole frequency distribution of results. For example, statement a (emphasizing labour union contracts as a reason for wage rigidity) received the highest score for less skilled workers. Nevertheless, for some 19 per cent of the surveyed firms applying labour union contracts, negotiated wages were unimportant or of minor importance to the explanation of wage rigidity. The significance of firm characteristics is tested with multivariate ordered probit models. Summary results are reported in Table 5 . This methodology may document the relevance of firm characteristics more appropriately than bivariate t-tests of scores as found in the study of Campbell and Kamlani (1997) , given the numerical conversions of qualitative statements and a possible presence of multicollinearity. The number of observations with valid information per skill group and explanation in these estimations varies between 689 and 726. The following discussion focuses on the German study and differences with results obtained for the USA.
Discussion
In Germany, as well as in the USA, some reasons for wage rigidity differ between skill groups, others do not. The exchange of pay and labour seems to be far away from the textbook model of one homogenous labour market. Human capital, labour regulation, and heterogeneity influence the wage distribution and wage rigidity.
In Germany, statements a (labour union contracts) and b (implicit contracts) received (very) strong support for less and medium skilled workers. For 57 per cent of respondents, labour union contracts are very important reasons for wage rigidity for the less skilled. A high degree of employment protection, codetermination in firms, and collective bargaining is quite common in Germany, which strengthens the bargaining power in collective i.
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Legal background for a labour union contract (reference cat.: no labour union contract) Membership in the employer association i.
Location of firms' headquarter (reference cat.: West Germany) East Germany wage bargaining rounds. This is in line with Swedish evidence Lundborg, 1995, 2003) and points to the role of collective wage bargaining legislation and the relatively high degree of labour regulation in Germany (see Botero et al., 2004) . For highly skilled workers, statements c (negative signals), e (fluctuation costs), and h (specific human capital) received very strong support. There is also strong support for statements e (fluctuation costs) and h (specific human capital) for skilled workers. Fluctuation costs therefore provide an important explanation for wage rigidity for skilled labour. In large German industrial firms, the costs of training in specific human capital, for example, can represent up to a 1-year salary (Franz and Soskice, 1995) . There is more support for the explanation of wage rigidity based on specific human capital in Germany compared with the USA, which points to the higher relevance of specific human capital in the German economy (see Krueger and Kumar, 2004) .
Statement d emphasizes the effect of wages on effort. In Germany, this statement receives strong support for all skill groups, while the values of the scores are rather similar. Campbell and Kamlani (1997) found a slightly higher support for less skilled and blue-collar workers. The responses to statements b on implicit contracts and e on the relevance of fluctuation costs are very similar in both surveys. Implicit contracts, wage-related effort variation, and fluctuation costs therefore seem to be lasting reasons for wage rigidity, despite different degrees of centralization in wage determination in both countries.
Major differences concern the effect of wages on quits and new hires. In the USA, statement g (adverse selection model applied to quits) received the strongest support for all skill groups. Responses did not differ much between skill groups in the German survey, although average scores are lower. One possible explanation for these differences may be due to employment protection legislation. According to German laws, employers must take social aspects into account when dismissing employees. Therefore, it might be more difficult to dismiss the least productive workers. Firms in the USA can put less emphasis on social aspects.
Further differences seem to exist in the responses to statement i (workers' resentments). A possible explanation for the stronger support for statement i in Germany rests on codetermination and collective wage bargaining legislation in Germany. Because of these specific workers' rights, the motive for conflict avoidance may be more relevant in Germany. This finding does not contradict the assumption of profit-maximizing behaviour, but indicates more severe constraints, resulting from labour regulation, on firm behaviour in Germany.
There is also a difference related to statement c that emphasizes the effect of wages on new hires, which finds much stronger support in Germany. One possible explanation is that in Germany, information on wages and the wage structure is more transparent and readily available due to the broader application of labour union contracts. Therefore, German firms might be somewhat more concerned with negative signalling effects stemming from wage cuts, which undermine their attractiveness to skilled workers. Presumably this is reinforced by a compressed wage structure in Germany (see Blau and Kahn, 1999; Fitzenberger, 1999) .
The stronger support for statement f (harassment) may confirm the view that the insider-outsider theory provides a foundation for collective rather than for individual behaviour (Fehr, 1990) . Campbell and Kamlani (1997) also find a much stronger support for statement f (harassment) in unionized firms. To shed some more light on the relevance of insider-outsider mechanism in Germany, we asked respondents in our German survey whether workers would agree upon 'pay moderation' either 'for keeping their own job' or 'for creating additional working places'. Respondents were given three categories of responses: yes, no, and not known for certain. Table 4 reports the results. Although, in the opinion of respondents, a majority of workers would comply with lower pay in order to secure their jobs, very few workers would comply in order to create additional employment. However, there is no evidence how workers themselves would view this issue.
To test the relevance of firm characteristics for the responses, ordered probit models for each statement were estimated. Table 5 reports whether a variable has proved to be significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level in the ordered probit model. 6 In the case of a significant coefficient, Table 5 reports '+' for positive values, and '-' for negative values.
Firm characteristics play a significant role in respondents' support for some but not all statements on wage rigidity, as indicated also by Lundborg (1995, 2003) and Campbell and Kamlani (1997) . Firms joining the bargaining employers' association significantly more often expressed support for statement a, which emphasizes the relevance of labour union contracts for wage rigidity. There is no difference between firms that voluntarily apply these contracts and those that do not at all apply (the reference category). This indicates that the type of labour union contract matters for the explanations of wage rigidity. For firms voluntarily applying collective wage agreements (around 20 per cent of all firms applying collective wage agreements, see Table 2 ), these contracts are not specific for the explanation of wage rigidity, which seems plausible. So even in the group of firms joining the collective wage system, economic reasons for wage rigidity are important.
Turning to the relevance of efficiency wage considerations, there is twofold evidence. First, the application of labour union contracts negatively affects the support for statements c [negative signals for hires; for (less) skilled workers] if the firm joins the employer association. Second, support for statement d [effort variation; for (less) skilled workers] and e (turnover cost; for highly skilled workers) is obtained only if the firm bargains with the union. These findings seem to indicate that firms that participate in the system of collective wage bargaining as members of the employers' association or with firm-specific contracts have less fear that wage reductions enhance the difficulty of hiring, raise fluctuation costs, or reduce effort. Because lowering wages in labour union contracts would apply to all firms, its specific impact on an individual firm is not that important, therefore.
Those firms that report strong evidence for recruitment difficulties for skilled staff support efficiency wage models with a higher probability, thereby reducing the room for wage cuts for the workers employed. However, this is not true for firms that report recruitment difficulties for highly skilled staff. From our point of view, this surprising result may mirror higher mobility cost for skilled labour compared with highly skilled labour in the German labour market.
There are only a few significant industry, firm size, and regional effects. Smaller firms seem to have more fear that wage reduction induces higher turnover (statement e) for (highly) skilled and a higher loss of specific human capital for all skill groups (statement g). However, smaller firms have less fear that lower wages reduces effort (statement d) for highly skilled. Otherwise there are no clear firm size effects. In addition, the location of the firms' headquarter seems to have only minor impacts for explanations of wage rigidity.
The presence of workers' councils reduces the support for explanations emphasizing the effect of wages on new hires (statement c), on effort (statement d), and of specific human capital (statement g), mainly for (less) skilled workers. Workers' councils in Germany as a rule represent the group of (less) skilled workers and, therefore, it is not surprising that their impact on explanations for highly skilled labour is small.
In summing up, the following explanations for wage rigidity put forward by economic theory are approved by survey respondents. In both countries, firms see implicit contracts as a potential reason for wage rigidity for less skilled workers, as well as turnover costs and a negative influence of wage reduction on workers' effort for all skill groups. Major differences between firms in Germany and the USA concern insider-outsider behaviour, labour union contracts, and explanations based on specific human capital and adverse selection considerations.
The relationship between different statements
Although each of the theories may, in principle, provide a reasonable explanation for wage rigidity, different explanations might be complements or substitutes in practice. Wage rigidity resulting from labour union contracts may be observed even in the absence of such contracts because of the existence of (unobservable) implicit contracts. Various efficiency wage arguments may as a whole provide greater explanatory power than one specific efficiency wage theory alone, compared with insideroutsider considerations, for example. If respondents support two statements, a positive relationship between these responses would indicate (according to our interpretation) that the additional or incremental influence or explanatory power of one of the two statements may, in fact, be small (depending on the magnitude of the correlation). Otherwise, if there is no observable relationship between two statements, each of the two theories behind the statements has its own power in explaining wage rigidity. Finally, a negative relationship indicates that more support for one statement reduces the support for the other, hence, the two theories may not be relevant at the same time.
Although Campbell and Kamlani (1997) asked firms to indicate the most important statement for explaining wage rigidity, our correlation analysis provides an attempt to study the relationship between different explanations. Respondents were asked about their view on nine statements for three worker groups. Taken together, one obtains 351 possible bivariate relations, which are quantified with Goodman's and Kruskal's g. This measure of correlation takes account of the ordered nature of the responses. It varies between minus and plus one. For example, a value of 0.7 implies that from 100 firms that express full support for a specific statement, 70 firms do so for another statement, too. For practical purposes and space restrictions, Table 6 reports 27 correlation values between the worker categories for each statement and 108 correlation values between the statements for each worker group.
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The following findings deserve attention. First, there is a skillspecific pattern with respect to the reasons for wage rigidity (part 1 of Table 6 ). The reasons for wage rigidity are very similar between skilled and highly skilled labour for all nine statements, and fairly similar for medium and less skilled labour. Although the correlation between less and highly skilled labour is also significant, the numerical values, with the only exceptions of statement f (harassment) and i (workers' resentments), are lower.
The following discussion concerns part 2 of Table 6 . The five statements emphasizing different versions of efficiency wages (statements c, d, e, g, and h) are positively correlated for all worker categories, with relatively high numerical values. These findings suggest that the incremental contribution of an additional version of efficiency wages for the explanation of wage rigidity seems to be rather small, although these five statements together receive a very strong support.
Third, there is a positive correlation between labour union contracts (a) and implicit contract (b) explanations for wage rigidity for all skill groups. This finding suggests that workers' desire for stable wages is met in part by labour union contracts. Fourth, there is mixed evidence on the correlation between labour union contracts and statements based on efficiency wages (c, d, e, g, and h ). This suggests that labour union contracts as well as efficiency wages provide a rationale for wage rigidity on its own. Labour union contracts seem to be no substitute for efficiency wages. The same seems to hold for the relationship between implicit contracts and efficiency wages. Although there are some positive values of a correlation between efficiency wage and implicit contract explanations, the numerical values are rather small. Hence, although each of these three groups of theoretical explanations contributes to the understanding of wage rigidity, the incremental explanatory power of implicit and labour union contracts seems to be lower when both are relevant. Fifth, insider-outsider theory (f) and conflict avoidance (i) as possible explanations of wage rigidity are weakly positively correlated with each other and with the efficiency wage explanations. Therefore, the additional explanatory power of these two theories, given the efficiency explanations, is moderately lower compared with its average and unconditional explanatory power as measured by the average score. To some extent, these findings may confirm the relevance of fluctuation costs, specific human capital, and wage-related effort variation for the bargaining power of insiders and the conflict avoidance strategy of firms.
Pay differentials in labour union contracts
From a legal point of view, firms in Germany are free to join the collective wage bargaining system. According to survey respondents, labour union contracts are an important rationale for wage rigidity in Germany. Therefore, the future of the German system of collective wage bargaining will depend on firms choices. We asked firms that apply such contracts whether they are planning to escape from industry-level wage bargaining. Eighty-five per cent of survey respondents denied. From the remaining firms, 39 per cent planned to withdraw membership of the employers' association, 24 per cent aimed at outsourcing parts of the production, and 25 per cent wanted to bargain directly with the union. From these answers, it seems reasonable to conclude that there is some limited pressure on labour union contracts, possibly caused by the wage rigidity induced by negotiated wages.
This pressure may be the reason for the observed trend on negotiating more flexible pay structures in the annual bargaining rounds in recent years. Labour union contracts nowadays more often contain hardship clauses and the possibility for lower pay for new hires and the long-term unemployed. Whether there exist such possibilities for pay differentiation in labour union contracts and, if so, to what extent these firms take advantage of this flexibility is reported in Table 7 . It contains the questions and the distribution of answers of respondents on hardship clauses, reduced pay for new hires, and reduced pay for long-term unemployed.
Only 11-15 per cent of the respondents confirm the existence of these flexible pay structures in labour union contracts, which is not that much. Surprisingly, however, the majority of firms that can take advantage of pay differentiation do not make use of it. There are two possible explanations for that finding. First, at the time the survey was conducted (1999), Germany was not in an economy-wide recession, hence there was presumably no urgent need for applying the hardship clause. Second, differentiated pay with respect to new hires and long-term unemployed may be considered as being unfair by employees (see Agell and Lundborg, 2003; Bewley, 1999; Campbell and Kamlani, 1997) .
As a result of our survey, the overwhelming share of firms that did not take advantage of differentiated pay answered that there was no economic necessity to do so, and only a minority feared disadvantages when operating on the labour market (multiple answers were possible). This result holds for hardship clauses as well as for differentiated pay for new hires and/or for the long-term unemployed. Because the number of respondents for these questions is rather small, the results should be taken with some caution. However, they are in line with the adverse selection model as applied to new hires and the relevance of fairness considerations in pay determination.
Conclusions
This study contributes to the literature concerning the empirical relevance of prominent explanations for wage rigidity, such as contract theory, implicit contract theory, efficiency wage theories, fair wage theory, and insider-outsider theory. Based on a survey of 801 firms in Germany, our findings rest on a unique set of questions on the type of labour union contracts in German firms and on econometric methods. Among others, the statistical correlation between various explanations for wage rigidity is analysed, because, say, two different explanations may by themselves provide a rationale for not cutting wages on their own, but lose part of their explanatory power when both are relevant.
Furthermore, we compare explanations for wage rigidity between Germany and the USA, two countries with diverse labour market legislations. Because German workers enjoy a higher degree of employment protection than American workers do and codetermination and collective bargaining are quite common in Germany, their bargaining power might be higher, especially in collective wage bargaining rounds. Differences in legislation may also indirectly influence the relevance of efficiency wage explanations for wage rigidity, because a more strict employment protection legislation or a wider application of labour union contracts might impose more restrictions on firms' wage policies.
German firms strongly support labour union contracts as an explanation for wage rigidity for (less) skilled workers. Specific human capital and negative signals for new hires received strong support for highly skilled employees. Campbell and Kamlani (1997) found the strongest support in the USA for the adverse selection model as applied to quits of highly skilled white-collar workers. This is not the case in our study, which seems to be the consequence of stronger employment protection legislation in Germany. In both countries, firms support implicit contract theory as an explanation for wage rigidity for less skilled workers as well as turnover costs and a negative influence of wage reduction on workers' effort for all skill groups. Compared with the evidence in the USA, insider-outsider behaviour and labour union contracts are more relevant for the explanation of wage rigidity from the viewpoint of German firms, which is probably due to the higher degree of unionization in Germany compared with the USA.
Different causes of wage rigidity are related to each other. There is a positive correlation between labour union contracts and implicit contract explanations for wage rigidity for all skill groups. This finding suggests that workers' desire for stable wages is met in part by labour union contracts. There is also a relatively high correlation between five variants of efficiency wage theories. This finding suggests that the incremental contribution of an additional version of efficiency wages for explaining wage rigidity is rather small, although each of the five variants receives high average scores. Finally, labour union contracts and efficiency wage explanations provide a rationale for wage rigidity on its own. Labour union contracts are no substitute for efficiency wage explanations of wage rigidity, and efficiency wage explanations provide no substitute for implicit contracts.
The German experience seems to more similar to the Swedish one, where unionization is higher than in Germany. Despite the influence of labour market institutions and labour legislation on wage rigidity, however, the economic rationale concerning wage rigidity has its own weight. For example: in the finance and insurance industries, only 14 per cent of workers are unionized; however, 70 per cent of the firms apply labour union contracts to almost all relevant workers. 5 The questionnaire is available on request. 6 In addition to the firm characteristics reported in Table 5 , we tested the influence of the skill structure, profit expectations in 2000 compared with 1998/99, and the share of flexible pay components. However, we could not find any evidence of the relevance of these variables. 7 The other values deal with the correlation between a statement for skill group A and another statement for skill group B. It is well-known that labour demand between skill groups is not independent from each other, see Hamermesh (1993) . Despite its importance for policy reasons, we are, however, not aware of any study that links skill specific explanations of wage rigidity and skill specific labour demand.
